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Tahoe Case: When Environmental Regulations Go “Too Far”
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
June 19, 2002

John R. Nolon
[Professor Nolon is Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law, the Director of
its Land Use Law Center, and a Visiting Professor at the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies.]
Abstract: This article reviews a recently decided United States Supreme Court case
which held that a thirty-two month moratorium on development did not constitute a
taking per se. The Court, building on logic from other recent decisions, found that
moratoria are an effective land use tool, which prevent inefficient land development and
consequently lead to increased land value. This article analyzes the court’s decision to
hold that moratoria are never takings per se, instead holding that a court shall perform
an ad hoc analysis to determine a moratorium’s constitutionality.
***
A recent U.S. Supreme Court case upheld a 32 month moratorium on
development and resolved questions regarding regulatory takings that have been
vigorously debated for years. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, [535 U.S. ___ (2002)] the court answered questions that
had been raised but not resolved as recently as last year in the case of Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island [121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001)]. First, some background.
Local governments are often discouraged from acting to protect the environment
because they are concerned that their regulations may go too far and constitute a
regulatory taking. As early as 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court held “that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.” [Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)] Occasionally, courts
find that a regulation adopted to protect the public interest is so burdensome that it
effectively takes title to the land. The constitutions of the United States and each of the
50 states allow local governments to appropriate private land interests for public
purposes but require that they compensate the affected owners by paying them the
market value of the land interest taken. [N.Y. Const. Art. I, § 7] Particularly onerous
regulations have, from time to time, been called regulatory takings, forcing the regulator
to pay just compensation for the values taken during the time the regulation remains in
effect.
The doctrine of regulatory takings limits governmental authority that is otherwise
extremely broad in scope. Local land use and environmental regulations, in fact, enjoy
several legal preferences. They are presumed to be constitutional. Those who

challenge them are said to have a particularly heavy burden of proof that the regulation
is arbitrary or capricious, a tough burden to carry. The courts use a rational basis test to
measure local laws affecting land use saying that any rational basis justifying the
adoption of the law is sufficient to overcome a claim that it is arbitrary. Local land use
and environmental laws are legislative acts. Normally, judges defer to legislative
judgments and do not heavily scrutinize legislative acts. When local laws leave no
viable economic use, when they are not justified by legitimate public interests, or when
they violate fundamental property rights, such as the right to exclude the public from the
owner’s possession, these laws risk being invalidated as regulatory takings and causing
the regulator to pay just compensation.
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, [121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001)] the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a landowner is not precluded from attacking a regulation that was in place
when he acquired title to the land. Palazzolo owned a 20 acre parcel, most of which was
salt marsh subject to tidal flooding. Development would have required significant fill, up
to six feet in some places, to support any development. Under the Rhode Island coastal
wetland regulations, development on the tidal wetlands portion of this site was
prohibited unless the owner secured a special exception permit for an activity that
serves a compelling public purpose which benefits the public as a whole. The
responsible state agency denied Palazzolo’s application to fill 11 of 18 tidal wetland
acres for a private beach club. Palazzolo had acquired title to the coastal property after
the tidal wetlands regulations had been adopted. Under case law in some states, this
fact would preclude a landowner from challenging the preexisting regulation as a taking.
In Gazza v. DEC, for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that “a promulgated
regulation forms part of the title to property as a preexisting rule of state law” precluding
the owner from raising a takings challenge against that rule. [89 NY 603 (1997)]
A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Palazzolo could not agree on whether
the existence of a regulation at the time of purchase should be considered in
determining whether the regulation interferes with the purchaser’s investment-backed
expectations, one of several factors used to determine if a taking has occurred. Without
guidance on that issue, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island
courts for a determination as to whether a taking had in fact occurred.
The U. S. Supreme Court also refused to consider Palazzolo’s claim that the
relevant parcel to use in a takings case is the land affected by the regulation, in this
case the 18 wetland acres in his 20 acre parcel. The majority decision recognized that
determining the parcel of land that should be considered when a takings claim is raised
is the “persisting question of what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction.”
Since this issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari to the Court, the majority
refused to consider it.
The questions left open by the Palazzolo case were addressed in 2002 in the
case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
[535 U.S. ___ (2002)] In Tahoe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a moratorium on all
development lasting 32 months was not, by itself, a taking. At issue in the Tahoe case

was the validity of a moratorium on development adopted by the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency to protect the unique environment and tourist-based economy of the
Tahoe region. The Agency was created by a novel compact between the legislatures of
California and Nevada. The compact gave land use authority over development in the
region to the Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. This area had previously been
regulated by agencies of two states, five counties and several municipalities, as well as
the Forest Service of the Federal Government. The objective of the regional agency
was to coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe Basin and to conserve
its natural resources.
In creating the Agency, the legislatures of the two states were motivated by the
treat posed by development to the clarity of Lake Tahoe which had begun to cloud as
early as the late 1950s. The culprit was locating development in the wrong place,
particularly in the steeper drainage areas near streams and wetlands. These resources
act as filters for much of the nitrogen, phosphorous, and other pollution that water runoff
carries. By 1980, it was obvious that the initial land use regulations adopted by the
Agency had failed. After the withdrawal of support by the State of California, the
Agency’s structure was redefined by amendments to the compact law in that year. The
Agency was directed by the two states to develop environmental threshold carrying
capacities including standards for air quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation
preservation, and noise. This new legislation halted temporarily all development in
critical environmental areas in region, giving the Agency the time it required to consider,
draft, adopt, and implement needed new regulations. That moratorium lasted for 32
months.
The legal challenge to this moratorium was launched by a nonprofit corporation
representing 400 owners of land in the critical environmental areas of the Basin who
had purchased their parcels prior to the 1980 changes in the compact legislation. They
claimed that the moratorium on the development of their properties was a regulatory
taking. Their essential argument was that, even though the regulation does not take the
future right to develop, the temporary taking of all development rights, for the 32 month
period, itself violates the constitution.
The owners’ argument raised an issue that had been hotly debated for years.
Are property rights in a single parcel of land severable for the purpose of takings law? If
property rights are defined in segments and one of those segments, such as the present
right to develop, it totally prohibited by a regulation, does that regulation constitute a
total taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council [505 U.S. 1003 (1992)]? If
property rights are to be segmented in this way for takings analysis, then it would be
possible to argue that regulations that prohibit use of a portion of the physical property,
as in the Palazzolo case, or that limit the functional enjoyment of the property – the
extent to which the owner can use the land – might constitute takings as well.
Broadly stated, the question was whether a regulation that totally limits the use a
portion of the land, whether limited by time, use, or space, deprives its owner of all
economically beneficial use under the constitution. Specifically, the legal question

addressed by the Tahoe case was whether a moratorium on development of land
constituted a regulatory taking, per se, that is, without any further inquiry into the
circumstances. The landowners argued for a categorical rule which would classify a
development moratorium as a taking without considering the moratorium’s length, the
severity of the problems addressed, the good faith of the agency involved, or what it did
to conduct the required studies, analyze the underlying problems, and draft appropriate
new regulations.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and refused to declare
that a moratorium is a categorical taking, regardless of the circumstances. In arriving at
this conclusion, the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that property interests
should be segmented, in time, use, or function, for the purpose of determining whether
the interests have been taken. The decision resolved the long standing debate on this
matter, affirming the ‘parcel as a whole rule’ adopted by the Court in Penn Central v.
City of New York. [438 U.S. 104 (1978)] “Logically, ‘ the Court noted, “a fee simple
estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use,
because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”
The Tahoe court held that a moratorium, like most other land use regulations, is
subject to an ad hoc inquiry that considers the circumstances of the case such as the
character of the regulation, the public interest to be achieved, the extent to which it
interferes with the owner’s investment-backed expectations, and how severely they are
affected by the regulation. In other words, a moratorium may be a taking, under the
circumstances of a particular case, but is not categorically so. In the Tahoe case, the
Court noted that the lower federal courts had concluded that the 32 month period was
not unreasonable and that the Agency had acted in good faith during that time to do
what needed to be done before the moratorium could be lifted. It further recognized that
the consensus of land use planners is that moratoria are an essential tool of successful
development.
Moratoria prevent landowners from rushing to develop, causing inefficient and illconceived growth before a comprehensive plan can be adopted. They prevent
regulators from making hasty decisions which would disadvantage landowners as well
as the public. The Court recognized that land values can actually increase during a
moratorium and that the public and all landowners are reciprocally benefited by
moratoria because they protect everyone’s interest against immediate construction that
might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted. Of
course, moratoria can be enacted that are not reasonable in these ways and they are
vulnerable, under Tahoe, to challenge.
The Tahoe case did not squarely raise the issue of whether the fact that a
landowner takes title to property after a regulation is adopted is relevant to that owner’s
taking claim. Justice Scalia stated in Palazzolo that “the fact that a restriction existed at
the time the purchaser took title … should have no bearing upon the determination of
whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking.” In her concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that “Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of

the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial….” She cited
Penn Central for the proposition that several factors are considered in determining
whether a regulation constitutes a taking, including whether it interferes with the
landowner’s legitimate investment-backed expectations. She noted that “the regulatory
regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape
the reasonableness of those expectations.”
In Tahoe, the majority decision quotes O’Connor’s statement on this matter in full
and calls her comments “instructive.” It appears likely that, in future cases, the court will
consider as instrumental the fact that an owner has purchased land after a regulation is
adopted in determining whether the owner’s investment-backed expectations are
violated.

